IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY internationally agreed on orthography for Romany, I have adopted a slightly simplified version of that currently used by the Musicological and Linguistics Institutes of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Characters that may be unfamiliar are:

č as in church
š as in shop
š indicates a rougher, alveopalatal sh
ź as in pleasure
h after k, p, t indicates aspiration

In Romany there are two forms of the sound represented by r in the text. In the words Rom and its derivatives (Romni, romanés, etc.), čoro, rodel, muro, the r represents a more intensely trilled and usually uvularized rhotic than normal r. The same holds for the second r in korkoro. In technical texts this sound would normally be indicated with a macron over the r.

All Romany words not in direct quotes are given in the singular (and in the case of adjectives) masculine form unless otherwise stated. Following Fél and Hofer (1969), when I use such words in the plural I have added an English s.

The Communist Party of Hungary was known as such only until 1948, when it changed its name. The name changed again in 1956, but I have kept the simple, generic title throughout.

M.S.
INTRODUCTION: THE LOWEST

OF THE LOW

Everywhere Gypsies are the lowest of the low. Why? Because they are different. Because they steal, are restless, roam, have the Evil Eye and that stunning beauty that makes us ugly to ourselves. Because their mere existence puts our values in question. Because they are all very well in operas and operettas, but in reality ... they are anti-social, odd and don’t fit in. “Torch them!” shout the skinheads.

Günter Grass, “Lostes”

UNTIL 1989 IT WAS OFFICIAL COMMUNIST POLICY in Eastern Europe to absorb Gypsies into the “ruling” working class. But many Gypsies fought to maintain their separate identity. This book is about the refusal of one group of Gypsies, the Rom, to abandon their way of life and accept assimilation into the majority population. Forget romantic notions of the careless freedoms of caravans and campfires; these Gypsies’ lives were hard and sometimes brutal. They dreamed of riches gained from gambling or lucky horse deals, but in reality they were poverty-stricken. They lived in semislums, ghettos in all but name, taken over from Hungarian peasants, and the law insisted that the Gypsies work, often for very low wages in industry or on collective farms. And yet despite their lowly position and all their suffering, they held onto an image of their own dignity and joy as Gypsies.

The people whom the reader will meet in this book are all Hungarian citizens, and their stories come from the time when that country, like the whole of Eastern Europe, was under Communist rule, but what they have to say concerns anyone who lives in the industrialized world. Ultimately,
this is a story about the sources of cultural diversity in modern industrial society and of the fear and hatred that such social and cultural difference may give rise to. The heart of the book, based on a total of eighteen months’ observation of daily life in a Gypsy settlement, describes the cultivation, celebration, and reinvention of cultural difference and diversity by a people deemed by its social superiors too stupid and uncivilized to have a culture at all. The other part of the story concerns the sometimes disastrous, sometimes comic, and sometimes sinister consequences of a well-intentioned policy of social engineering. Although the Hungarian attempt to impose a standardized vision of how an ethnic minority like the Gypsies should live was in some respects a specifically Communist project, in many other ways it illustrated a relation between social reformers and the people who were supposed to benefit from these reforms that could have been found anywhere in the “democratic” Western world.

**Post-Communist Gypsies, or Roma**

In April 1993 seventeen-year-old Magdalena Babicka stood on the stage of a newly renovated hotel in the Czech spa town of Karlovy Vary. Magdalena was one of the twelve finalists in a new, televised competition, Miss Czech-Slovakia. At one point in the evening, the master of ceremonies asked the girls, one by one, about their ambition. The options chosen by the other girls, air hostess, model, or even journalist, were not for Magdalena. “I want to become a public prosecutor,” she announced, “so I can clean our town of its dark-skinned inhabitants.” Magdalena, appearing for the first time on national television, looked around nervously for an instant, but the ripple of laughter in the invited audience turned into a burst of applause. Magdalena’s “little joke” had worked. “You’re a brave girl,” the master of ceremonies told her. “Some newspapers won’t like you for saying that, but those of us who don’t live in your town have no idea how difficult things are.”

The next morning Magdalena found that she had turned herself into headline material across Europe. The BBC World Service broadcast an item about her, and newspapers across the Continent told the story of the “Czech beauty” who “wants to rid her town of Gypsies.” For a few days in the Czech Republic, there was talk of prosecuting her, but the authorities decided to let the dust settle over the incident.

Magdalena had inadvertently set off a small international outcry, but back in her hometown the work for which she thought herself fitted was already being initiated. The impending separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics meant that all residents of the former Czechoslovakia had to acquire new papers and proof of citizenship. In the Second World
War, the Nazis had wiped out the Czech Gypsy population, so in 1993 many of those living in the Czech lands were still seen by Czechs as “immigrants” from Slovakia. Their presence had long caused resentment among the tidy Czechs, and the redefinition of nationality provided a chance, to officials so minded, to encourage some of the troublesome and “antisocial” Gypsies to leave. Through a clever use of stalling, obfuscation, and bureaucratic intimidation, several families from Magdalena’s hometown were being sent on their way by spring 1993. And despite the restraining influence of the media, alerted by Magdalena’s outburst, by August 1995 conservative estimates suggested that 25,000 Czech Gypsies (out of a total population of 200,000) were now being excluded from citizenship and voting rights in the country where they lived and worked.

But it was not just in the order-obsessed Czech Republic that Gypsies were discovering a harsh new reality. Gypsies have become the scapegoats of postcommunism throughout the region. In the Czech Republic, most of the petty and not so petty machinations that are worked against luckless Gypsy families have the seal of bureaucratic procedure stamped on them. Elsewhere in post-Communist Europe, the marks of oppression are different. Gypsy refugees from warring Yugoslavia have repeatedly claimed that they were the first sent into battle by their Croat and Serb commanders. In Romania in the first two years after the revolution, nearly two hundred Gypsy homes were burned to the ground in eleven separate incidents. Five individuals died in these attacks. There were countless other incidents of random beatings, some of them carried out with official connivance. In Poland, and in Hungary, too, there have been lynchings and small-scale pogroms. In the three years from 1993 through 1995, twenty-eight Gypsies were killed by skinheads in the Czech Republic. In a more organized fashion throughout the region, revived fascist parties have targeted Gypsies rather than the former victims of the extreme right, the Jews.

Gypsy suffering has not been caused by racist violence alone. Having been the cheap labor of Warsaw Pact communism, Gypsies have often suffered most from the social and economic disintegration that has affected the whole region since 1989. In Hungary in 1994, 65 percent of Gypsy men were unemployed. The figure rose to an astonishing 90 percent in one of the northern counties, a former center of steel production. Incidents of terror and the objective hopelessness of the economic situation of most Gypsies in the new order have led inevitably to migration and flight. In Germany in 1993, estimates from Gypsy organizations suggested that there were more than 30,000 Romanian Gypsy asylum-seekers. So severe was the problem that special arrangements seem to have been made at that time between the Czech and German authorities not to
allow Romanian Gypsies through their borders. And in early 1996 there were plans afoot in Warsaw to deport large numbers of those Gypsies unable to get any farther west than Poland.7

The history of persecution, suffering, and forced assimilation provokes two questions about the Gypsies. First, just what makes them so threatening to their host populations? And second, the central question that I try to answer in this book, given the hostility toward them, how and why do the Gypsies go on?

The problem is even more striking when seen in a deeper historical perspective. For as long as there have been Gypsies in Europe, they have suffered hostility, segregation, and misery. In preindustrial Europe, despite finding an occupational niche, especially in rural areas of Eastern Europe, where they provided crafts and services, the Gypsies were harried as they traveled and harassed when they settled. In the Czech lands in the sixteenth century, the Gypsies were forced to be executioners, in the Romanian provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia they were enslaved, and in the France of the Sun King they were tied into the galleys as oarsmen. In the late eighteenth century in Hungarian-administered Slovakia, some forty Gypsy men and women were executed for a supposed cannibal feast that was later proved to have never taken place. A novel solution to “the Gypsy problem” in the Austro-Hungarian Empire was adopted around this time by the “enlightened absolutist” rulers Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II: Gypsy children were to be forcibly adopted into peasant families and their parents declared “new Hungarians” or “new peasants.” The policy failed in large part because the nobility objected to the loss of a source of cheap labor.8 The rise of capitalism and democratic or quasidemocratic states reinforced, if anything, the marginal position of the Gypsies. From the late nineteenth century one finds in law books and local edicts across Europe traces of efforts to restrict the movement of the Gypsies and control the “nomad menace.”9

Only very recently have a small number of Gypsies begun to respond to persecution by organizing political parties and social movements. Meetings of Gypsy intellectuals and political leaders have been held under the formal aegis of the International Romany Union, with representatives from twenty-six countries. Numerous less formal gatherings, known as the Romano Congresso (the Rom Conference), take place each year in Eastern Europe. But for the ordinary Gypsy in one of the unofficial ghettos on the edge of an Eastern European village or town, the maneuvers of Gypsy intellectuals on the national and international stages rarely mean much, at least as yet. Sometimes it seems that the Romany political parties spend more effort establishing their credibility among non-Gypsy authorities than among their own constituents. Even though in most countries these leaders have successfully argued that the Gypsies
should be treated as an ethnic minority and have succeeded in changing some official practices—for instance, Gypsies are now normally referred to in the media as Roma, or some local version of this, rather than the derogatory local words for Gypsies, Zigeuner in German, Cigány in Hungarian, Tsigani in Romanian—the leaders’ concerns remain very different from those of ordinary Gypsies. It is a telling statistic that in a recent survey of 10,000 Hungarian Gypsies, 90 percent of the respondents were unable to name a single Gypsy political party.\(^{10}\)

To understand how ordinary Gypsies survive persecution and perpetuate their way of life, we have to turn away from the round-tables and international forums beloved of journalists and television reporters and toward the politics of daily life on and off the Gypsy settlements in Eastern Europe. It is in the repeated negotiation of identity and interest, in conflict with hostile non-Gypsies in towns such as the one I lived in, that the secret of Gypsy survival will be found.

**Communists and Gypsies**

Since the beginning of the Second World War, there have been two dramatic attempts to “solve the Gypsy problem” once and for all. Between 1941 and 1945, the Nazis exterminated some 500,000 Gypsies in an effort to eliminate their “degenerate” and “antisocial” way of life.\(^{11}\) Between 1957 and 1989, a very different sort of campaign against the Gypsies was waged in Eastern Europe. No one was to be imprisoned, let alone killed. Indeed, repression and discrimination could not have been further from the thoughts of the early Communist reformers. But the desired end was surprisingly close to the fascist dream: The Gypsies were to disappear.

The task that Eastern European Communists set themselves in 1957 was indeed herculean—the social and cultural assimilation of millions of people who had suffered discrimination for centuries. But the Communists believed that history was on their side.\(^{12}\) And then there was the desire to use the Gypsies as an example. What better proof could there be of the power of the Communist method of social transformation than the disappearance of the Gypsies? So throughout the Communist bloc, with the partial exception of Yugoslavia, the Gypsies were subject to a systematic assimilationist campaign. Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union, Romania, and Hungary pursued almost identical policies.\(^{13}\)

While in the capitalist West the Gypsy problem receded after the war, in the East two factors kept the Gypsies in the public and official eye. First was their demographic importance. Whereas the Gypsies made up a tiny proportion (0.1–0.3 percent) of the population in the West, across the Iron Curtain they formed up to 5 percent and were often, as in Hungary, the largest single ethnic group. Second was the fact that the mere existence of
the Gypsies grated on the Communist ideological sensitivities. These are issues I return to in Chapter 6, but the reader may find it helpful to have the key elements highlighted here.

From the Communist point of view, Gypsies were the poorest of the poor. They often lived in hovels outside of the village to which they were attached, and in some highly visible places, such as the capital of Hungary, the Gypsies could still be found living in caves. Hardly any of them had any education, and as few had jobs. Faced with this deeply uncivilized legacy of the capitalist past, the authorities took what, to their minds, was a sympathetic approach. Although the “anarchic” and “unproductive” Gypsy way of life might have been a rational response to extreme social marginalization and poverty, Communist society could provide a home for the Gypsies and so integrate them into “normal” life. In the past the Gypsies had been excluded from villages by Magyar peasants or only allowed to live beside the village carrion pit; they had systematically been paid less than their Magyar landless neighbors for identical work and had often found themselves paid in kind, not cash. The Communists would put an end to such discrimination.

Crucially, however, the Gypsies were not to be allowed to “enter society” on their own terms. From the Communist point of view, there was a profound opposition between the Gypsy attitude toward wealth, work, and good housekeeping and the socialist one. Communist theoreticians argued that when capitalist industrialization had rendered the Gypsies’ traditional skills (as foresters, trough and basket makers, petty blacksmiths, and musicians) redundant, most of them had been reduced to scavenging and begging. Some had tried to surrender their way of life, but there were others who instead had turned to “hustling.” From the official point of view, this “wheeling and dealing” was either a more developed form of begging or, worse, active commercial exploitation. Either way, these Gypsies “lived off the labor of others.” The Communists viewed the Gypsies as members of the lumpen proletariat and so as potential opponents of the socialist transformation of society. The task, therefore, was to “raise” them into the working class by putting them to work in factories. There, the discipline, the organization, and the collective spirit of the socialist production line would provide the Gypsies with a model not just for the time spent working but for all their lives. The values of labor, thrift, and diligence would replace their old, feckless, and irresponsible moral code. By finding their place in the proletariat, the Gypsies would find their place at the heart of social life; their age-old exclusion would cease, and so would their distinct identity and lifestyle.

I discuss these ideas at much greater length later, but it is important to understand from the outset that in many ways the Communist doctrine that labor was the sole legitimate source of value and that the profits of
“trade” and “commerce” were morally illegitimate reproduced ideas that were already current among the mass of Hungarians. So in contrast to the numerous unpopular Communist policies, the effort “to put the Gypsies to gainful work” was a project that had widespread support in the population.

Ironically, however, far from merging into the working class, the Gypsies, and the “problems” associated with them, became more prominent as the assimilation campaign continued. By the time I began doing my research in 1984–1985, the “Gypsy question” had a public salience greater than at any time since the 1930s. There were two sources of this renewed anti-Gypsy feeling that I deal with in this book. First, there was a dramatic gap between the theory of social assimilation and the reality of increasing social differentiation. Non-Gypsies were being told by the Communists that much was being done to improve the Gypsies’ lot and that the disappearance of the Gypsies might soon be expected. But there was very little evidence that this was the case. Ordinary Hungarians saw good money being thrown after bad as rehousing policies did not achieve their goals, schooling results failed to live up to expectations, and Gypsy communities carried on, some thriving. Second, the policy reproduced, in a new guise, old ideas about the Gypsies as “the other.” As the social and economic system stumbled into crisis in the 1980s, so the otherness of Gypsies became more prominent and threatening. But this happened in surprising ways, for these were confusing times. One unexpected way in which the “Gypsies” erupted into political discourse was in a common rhetorical device for trashing the Communist Party and its apparatchiks: to describe them as people with a Gypsy mentality. The very people who were trying to get rid of the Gypsies were now popularly described as Gypsies themselves.

The fall of communism brought freedom of political expression for all hues of the political spectrum. Feelings that had formerly not been allowed public expression have surfaced and been intensified by the way Eastern Europe has been drawn into the world economy. But the ideas by which the Gypsies are judged have changed surprisingly little. Notions of honest labor, just prices, and reward for effort, which informed popular discussions of the economy under the Communists, still fuel the fear and loathing felt so widely toward the Gypsies. Nowadays, the wealth of the new robber baron capitalists appears to bear little relation to effort and diligence. And it is again the Gypsies who are the focus for the anger of people who feel excluded from the system. Those rare individual Gypsies who have succeeded in manipulating the new possibilities have brought down the wrath of their non-Gypsy neighbors. Often the success of these Gypsies is interpreted as the result of a cunning, simultaneous manipulation of both the market and the state benefit system—just as in
the past the Gypsies were thought to benefit both from state handouts and from the semilegal trade sector. So although this book deals only with the period up to the fall of communism, in its pages the reader will find stories and experiences that are being repeated across Eastern Europe today. As Magdalena Babicka’s mother told me: “I would very much like to see the day when honest work will be properly rewarded. I wouldn't have any worries then. So that those who do not want to work have a lower living standard than those who do. Today people like me live so close to those who live off social benefits. We have to install some sort of a legal order here.” It is, then, at the rich Gypsies, as much as at the half-starved Gypsy pickpockets and thieves, that the ethnic cleansers now direct their fury.

**Modernity and Diversity**

It is an all-pervasive myth of the modern age that says our time is witnessing the replacement of cultural difference and diversity by a homogenized global culture. Like any good myth, this modern one is constantly being reinvented in apparently new guises. In the nineteenth century, Karl Marx argued that the spread of commodification would render all aspects of human existence quantifiable on a single (monetary) scale, that “everything solid melts into air.” Although Marx put his prediction in a radical context, his argument seems closely related to the liberal view, expounded most fully perhaps by Max Weber and George Simmel, that the rise of a modern nation-state based on standard bureaucratic and technical apparatuses would require a shared, uniform body of knowledge and culture. Both the radical and the liberal visions were of a flattened social and cultural landscape. Fifty years later, postwar theories of mass or consumer society revived these ideas for boom-time capitalism, while in Eastern Europe official Communist ideology seemed to promote an analogous vision of modernity: the leveling of class, ethnic, and national differences to create a homogeneous and unitary society. At the same time, as if echoing Communist propaganda, Western Cold War mythology asserted that communism turned all its subjects into uniform little gray men. Uniting all these myths was the idea that the “imperatives” of machine production, market organization, bureaucratic power, global means of communication, unleashed forces of production, or some combination of these would ensure that when diverse peoples were brought into the same technological, social, and cultural space, difference and variation would be eliminated.

From the perspective of modernization theories, the existence of groups, such as the Gypsies, displaying striking cultural “difference” from the surrounding population appears to result from their lack of in-
integration into the wider social order. This book argues the opposite point of view, starting from an argument made forty-five years ago by Claude Lévi-Strauss in an essay he wrote for UNESCO: “Besides those differences due to isolation, there are those (just as important) due to proximity, that is, the desire to differ to stand out, to be oneself. ... Diversity,” he said, “is less a function of the isolation of groups than of the relationships that unite them.” What this book shows is that, far from creating a world of little gray men, the Communists inadvertently provided a particularly fertile ground for preserving and elaborating cultural difference.

In developing this argument, I use three separable levels and styles of analysis. The book opens with some of the Gypsy characters who taught me much of what I know about the Gypsy way. Then, outside the settlement in the world of the factory, I take the opportunity to give a broader, macro-perspective on features of the social landscape that impinged on the lives of the Gypsies. The Gypsies’ view of the socialist factory and the socialist market, of the formation of government policy and its application by local government, was inherently limited. Hence, I adopt a new language and level of analysis in Chapters 5 and 6. Finally, in Chapters 9 through 12, to develop an understanding of the resilience of their way of life, I introduce a more structuralist perspective in interpreting Gypsy or Rom ideology, the ideas that inform Rom cultural activities. I make no bones about mixing levels of analysis and what seem to me appropriate literary styles in this fashion. Each of these corresponds to an aspect of the total social process. To listen only to the Rom’s official account of themselves would be to succumb to a romantic view of “Gypsy freedom.” To pay heed only to an objective, sociological view of the position of the Gypsies in the Hungarian division of labor would be to commit the converse error: to imagine that the Gypsies had no autonomy and merely reacted passively to their circumstances. It is in the lives of individuals, observed through fieldwork, that we can see how these two aspects of social life meet and how real people survive and surmount the contradictions they face. And so it is to them, ultimately, that I return. I hope that, by trying to integrate the three worlds of the Gypsies, their peasant neighbors, and the socialist state into a single study, I have given a more precise ethnographic sense than has been customary in earlier studies of the Gypsies and the wider context in which they found themselves.

The Local Setting and the Problem of Difference

In October 1984, together with my six-week-old son, Gergely, and his mother, Judit Szegő, I moved to the town of Harangos, two hours’ drive
from Budapest. There I spent the next fifteen months\(^{10}\) in the settlement known locally as “The Third Class.” The name, it turned out, referred not to its level of comfort or its reputation but to a technical classification of types of land around the town. Harangos, an agrotown situated just north of the great Hungarian plain, had more than 1,000 Gypsy inhabitants (according to a then recent, if unreliable, census). There is always something arbitrary about the choice of a fieldwork site, and Harangos happened to be the first place where I could envisage doing fieldwork in reasonably propitious circumstances. In particular this meant that the town was prosperous enough to afford plenty of employment opportunities in local factories for the Rom: They did not have to commute weekly to Budapest as did many Rom from poorer areas. The Rom themselves were therefore neither miserably impoverished nor so wealthy as to make fieldwork a tricky prospect: Our research relies, after all, on people’s willingness to leave their doors open for us. But there was also a self-esteem and dignity among the Rom of the Third Class that attracted me. In other settlements I had visited with my ethnomusicologist guide we had been taken into the Gypsies’ homes and seated on the smartest furniture. Here, the Rom gathered in a courtyard and sat us on the ground, “in the Gypsy way,” as they would with one another. These were Gypsies who were not afraid of seeming “uncivilized”; they were too proud for that.

In contrast to what outsiders might expect, the Gypsies in Hungary historically did not form a single, homogeneous group. I chose to research among the Vlach Gypsy group, who alone of all Gypsies in Hungary call themselves Rom. Therefore when I talk of the Rom and Rom ways of doing things it is to them alone that I refer. To avoid confusion, I should say that there is no universally agreed on set of categories for classifying Gypsy groups. Hungarian scholars normally talk of three main groups of Gypsies. The so-called Hungarian Gypsies formed the majority, perhaps even 70 percent of the total, and were found throughout the country. These were, by and large, descendants of Gypsies whose ancestors had spoken the Carpathian dialect recorded by Archduke Franz Josef in his dictionary of 1893. One hundred years later, most of these spoke only Hungarian, though in a few communities where some independent economic activity had been sustained, their dialect of Romany was still spoken. Then there were the Boyash Gypsies, who made up some 10 percent of the total, living mostly in the southern counties where their ancestors had arrived from Romania and Serbia at the end of the nineteenth century. They spoke an eighteenth-century dialect of Romanian and were traditionally renowned as foresters and woodworkers, especially tounmakers. Finally, the Romany-speaking Gypsies of various subdialects—the Gypsies of the Third Class in Harangos spoke the Mašari dialect—accounted for some 20 percent of the population. Their ancestors had
come in several waves of migration from Transylvania and the Romanian principalities during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and they now lived dispersed throughout the country. They were especially numerous in the far eastern counties and around the major industrial towns. A majority were Vlach, that is to say, immigrants from the Romanian provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia at the turn of the last century; a minority were from other Transylvanian groups. Ordinary Hungarians and officials alike thought these to be the “worst” of the Gypsies.

Linguistic and historical differences aside, from a sociological point of view none of these Gypsy “groups” formed a homogeneous population. Family organization and culture were varied, and consequently official policies did not have a uniform, across-the-board effect. The Hungarian Gypsies were mostly laborers in factories and building sites, but some were also traders selling fashionable clothes and other consumer goods. Boyash Gypsies were mostly employed as miners and agricultural laborers but also traded in wooden tools. Vlach Gypsies, too, were mostly proletarians, but they also managed to dominate the horse trade and, increasingly, the used-car market.

The reader will discover that this last point was particularly important in shaping the experience of the Harangos Gypsies. Communist hostility and, later, ambivalence toward trade meant that the Gypsies who dealt on the market were particularly liable to repressive measures. But from the Rom point of view, as I demonstrate in Chapter 6, Communist practice merely repeated earlier non-Gypsy attitudes. In the interwar period, the Gypsies had been attacked by the Far Right in Hungary for their “do-nothing” lifestyle, and when the Nazis occupied the country and started deporting Gypsies, it was likewise because they “didn’t work” and were “unproductive parasites.”

The idea that ethnic minorities may take on the role of “intermediary” and play an especially prominent role in trade and markets is a very familiar one in social science. But perhaps because we think that we know intuitively what a market is, surprisingly little has been written about how such groups actually think about their activity as traders. One of the more distinctive features, I believe, of this book is its attempt at a detailed ethnography of a market and the rich symbolism of trade for the Rom.

The variation among Gypsy groups means that no single book could tell the story of all Hungarian Gypsies under communism. Given this diversity I would have been pursuing a mirage if I had hunted for an “average” Gypsy community. Nevertheless, I believe that in Harangos I found most of the issues that pitted Gypsies of all groups against ordinary Magyars and Communists elsewhere in Hungary. The particular way the Rom resisted assimilation may have been unique to them, but none of the other